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ARCHIVUM MATHEMATICUM (BRNO)Tomus 29 (1993), 123 { 133Z{EQUILIBRIA IN MANY{PLAYERSTOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMESSvatoslav GaidovAbstract. In this paper N -person nonzero-sum games are considered. The dy-namics is described by Ito stochastic dierential equations. The cost-functions areconditional expectations of functionals of Bolza type with respect to the initialsituation. The notion of Z-equilibrium is introduced in many-player stochastic dif-ferential games. Some properties of Z-equilibria are analyzed. Sucient conditionsare established guaranteeing the Z-equilibrium for the strategies of the players. Ina particular case of a linear-quadratic game the Z-equilibrium strategies are foundin an explicit form. 1. IntroductionIn this paper we follow the approach of Fleming and Rishel [1] to the optimalcontrol of stochastic dynamic system, but applied in situations of conicts, i.e. tostochastic dierential games. Let f1; : : : ; Ng be the set of players. The dynamicsis described by the following Ito stochastic dierential equation:dx (t) = f (t; x(t); u1; : : : ; uN ) dt+ g(t; x(t); u1; : : : ; uN) dw(t); t 2 [t0; T ] :The control ui is chosen by the i-th player in the feedback form ui = ui(t; x(t))with the objective of minimizing the personal cost-functionJi(ui; : : : ; uN) = Et0 ;x0f	i(T; x(T )) + R Tt0Li(t; x(t); u1; : : : ; uN ) dtg; i 2 I :As a solution of the game the concept of Z-equilibrium is proposed. In deter-ministic dierential games this notion is introduced by Zhukovskii in [8] and intwo-player stochastic dierential games by the author in [2]. The Z-equilibriumis based on the concept of Pareto-optimality, see Gaidov [3], [4] and represents afurther development in the theory in comparison with the Nash-equilibrium , seeGaidov [3], [5].1991 Mathematics Subject Classication : 93E05.Key words and phrases: nonzero-sum game, many-player game, stochastic dierential equa-tion, linear-quadratic game, Bolza functional, cost-function, strategy.Received June 1, 1988.
124 SVATOSLAV GAIDOVThe present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider accuratelythe formalization of the game and a model of a linear-quadratic game. In Section3 we recall some denitions and quote some results from our papers [3 { 6]. InSection 4 we introduce the notion of Z-equilibrium in many-player stochastic dif-ferential games and analyze some of its properties. Sucient conditions for theZ-equilibrium strategies of the players are established in Section 5. Finally in Sec-tion 6 in the linear-quadratic game the Z-equilibrium strategies are found in anexplicit form. 2. Formalization of the gamesLet us consider the game  = hI;P; fUigi2I ; fJigi2Ii :Here I = f1; : : : ; Ng is the set of players participating in the game  . The evolutionof the dynamic systemP is described by Ito stochastic dierential equation of thetype(*) dx(t) = f(t; x(t); ui; : : : ; uN) dt+ g(t; x(t); u1:; : : : ; uN) dw(t); t 2 [t0; T ]with initial condition x(t0) = x0 2 Rn where T > t0  0. The process W =fw(t); t 2 [t0; T ]g is a standard m-dimensional Wiener process dened on somecomplete probability space (
;F ;P) and is adapted to a family F = fFt; t 2[t0; T ]g of nondecreasing sub--algebras of F . The vector x(t) 2 Rn is the stateprocess and ui 2 Ui  Rni is the control of the i-th player, i 2 I. Now letus make the following assumptions about the functions f(t; x; ui; : : : ; uN) andg(t; x; u1; : : : ; uN ). Supposef : [t0; T ]Rn U1      UN ! Rnand g : [t0; T ]Rn U1      UN ! RnRmhave continuous partial derivatives in x; u1; : : : ; uN and let C > 0 be a constantsuch that jf(t; 0; : : : ; 0)j+ jg(t; 0; : : : ; 0)j 5 C ;jfxj+ jgxj+Pi2I(jfui j+ jguij) 5 C :Here j  j is a general symbol for the norms in the respective spaces.Each player has complete information about the state vector x(t) at every mo-ment t 2 [t0; T ] and constructs his strategy in the game   as an admissible feedbackcontrol, i.e. ui = ui(t; x(t))
Z{EQUILIBRIA IN STOCHASTIC GAMES 125where ui(; ) : [t0; T ]Rn ! Uiis a Borel function satisfying the conditions:(i) There exists a constant Mi > 0 such thatjui(t; x)j 5 Mi(1 + jxj) for all (t; x) 2 [t0; T ]Rn ;(ii) For each bounded set B  Rn and T  2 (t0; T ) there exists a constantKi > 0 such that for arbitrary x; y 2 B and t 2 [t0; T ]jui(t; x)  ui(t; y)j 5 Kijx  yj :Denote by Ui the set of strategies of the i-th player, i 2 I and U = Qi2I Ui; U =Qi2IUi. Let a vector of strategies u = (ui; : : : ; uN ) 2 U be called for brevity simplya strategy.The assumptions made above imply the existence and sample path uniquenessof the solution X = fx(t); t 2 [t0; T ]g of Ito equation () corresponding to thecontrol u 2 U , see Fleming and Rishel [1]. Moreover, X is an a.s. continuousMarkov process and its innitesimal operator A(u) has the formA(u)V (t; x) = f 0(t; x; u)Vx(t; x) + 12 tr [a(t; x; u)Vxx(t; x)] ;where a = gg0 and prime denotes vector or matrix transpose. Here V (t; x) is areal-valued function with continuous partial derivatives up to second order for allt 2 [t0; T ]; x 2 Rn.Let Li, 	i be continuous functions satisfying the polynomial growth conditions:jLi(t; x; ui; : : : ; uN)j 5 Ci(1 + jxj+Pi2I juij)kj	i(t; x)j 5 Ci(1 + jxj)kwhere Ci; k are positive constants. Introduce now the cost-function Ji(u) of thei-th player:Ji(u) = Et0 ;x0f	i(T; x(T )) + R Tt0 Li(t; x(t); u1; : : : ; uN ) dtg; i 2 I :The object of each player in the game   is to minimize his own cost-function.Now let us consider one particular but important case of the game describedabove. Let  lq = hI;Pl; fU ligi2I fJqi gi2Ii :Here again I = f1; : : : ; Ng. The evolution of the dynamic system Pl is describedby the linear stochastic dierential equation of the typedx(t) = [A(t)x(t) +Pi2IBi(t)ui] dt+ g(t; x(t); u1; : : : ; uN) dw(t); t 2 [t0; T ]
126 SVATOSLAV GAIDOVwith initial condition x(t0) = x0 2 R. Here x(t) 2 R is the state process, W =fw(t); t 2 [t0; T ]g is an (N + 2)-dimensional standard Wiener process and ui 2Ui  R is the control of the i-th player, i 2 I. g(t; x(t); ui; : : : ; uN ) is an 1(N+2)-matrix of the formg = (g0(t)x(t) g1(t)u1 : : : gN (t)uN gN+1(t)) :Henceforth A(t); Bi(t); i 2 I; g0(t); gN+1(t); gi(t); i 2 I are continuous real-valued functions. The strategies of the i-th player are identied to functions of thetype ui(t; x) = Fi(t)x where Fi(t) is a continuous real-valued function, i 2 I. Thecost-function Jqi (u) of the i-th player is the functionalJqi (u) = Et0 ;x0fDix2(T ) + R Tt0 [Mi(t)x2(t) +Pj2IN (i)j (t)u2j ] dtg; i 2 I :Here Di are constants andMi(t); i 2 I; N (i)j (t), i; j 2 I are real-valued continuousfunctions. 3. Auxiliary notions and resultsFor the completeness of presentation we need some facts from previous papers.Denition 3.1. ([3], [4]). The strategy uP 2 U is said to be Pareto-optimal inthe game   if the relations Ji(u) 5 Ji(uP ); i 2 Ifor some strategy u 2 U imply the equalitiesJi(u) = Ji(uP ); i 2 I :Theorem 3.2. ([3], [4]). The strategy uP 2 U is Pareto-optimal in the game  if there exist a vector  = (1; : : : ; N ) 2 RN, i > 0, i 2 I, 1 +   + N = 1and real-valued function V (t; x) such that for all t 2 [t0; T ], x 2 Rn the followingconditions jointly hold:(a) V; Vt; Vx; Vxx are continuous;(b) H(t; x; uP ) = 0;(c) H(t; x; u) = 0 for each strategy u 2 U ;(d) V (T; x) =Pi2I i	i(T; x).Here for all t 2 [t0; T ], x 2 Rn, u 2 U :H(t; x; u) = Vt(t; x) +A(u)V (t; x) +Pi2IiLi(t; x; u):DenoteD =Pi2IiDi; M(t) =Pi2I iMi(t) and N (i) (t) =Pj2I jN (j)i (t) ; i 2 I :
Z{EQUILIBRIA IN STOCHASTIC GAMES 127Proposition 3.3. ([3], [4]). Let there exist a vector  = (1; : : : ; N ) 2 RN suchthat i > 0, i 2 I, 1 +   + N = 1, D is a non-negative constant, M(t) is anon-negative function and N (i) (t) is a positive function for each t 2 [t0; T ]. ThenuPi =  [g2i (t)K(t) + N (i) (t)] 1Bi(t)K(t)x; i 2 Iare Pareto-optimal strategies in the game  lq where K(t) is the solution of thenonlinear dierential equation_K(t) + 2A(t)K(t) +M(t) + g20(t)K(t) K2(t)Pi2I [g2i (t)K(t) + N (i) (t)] 1B2i (t) = 0with the boundary condition K(T ) = D.Remark 3.4. It is important to mention that the existence of the functionK(t) = 0, t 2 [t0; T ] follows e.g. from the well-known Bellman quasilineariza-tion method, see Roitenberg [7].Let us recall two other denitions.Denition 3.5. ([3], [5]). The strategy un 2 U is a Nash-equilibrium strategy inthe game   if for each ui 2 UiJi(un1 ; : : : ; uni 1; ui; uni+1; : : : ; unN ) = Ji(unjjui) = Ji(un); i 2 I :Denition 3.6. ([6]). The strategy ugi 2 Ui is a guaranteeing strategy of the i-thplayer in the game   ifminui maxuIri Ji(ui; uIri) = maxuIri Ji(ugi ; uIri):Here I r i = f1; : : : ; i  1; i+ 1; : : : ; Ng and uIri = (ui; : : : ; ui 1; ui+1; : : : ; uN ) 2Qj2IriUj = UIri. Let also (ui; uIri) = u.4. Z-equilibrium. Basic propertiesNow we generalize for many-player games the concept of Z-equilibrium , con-sidered for two-player games in Gaidov [2].Denition 4.1. The strategy u 2 U is an active equilibrium strategy in thegame   if for each player i 2 I we have: for any strategy ui 2 Ui there exists acollection of strategies ûIri 2 UIri such thatJi(ui; ûIri) = Ji(u) :
128 SVATOSLAV GAIDOVDenition 4.2. The strategy uZ 2 U is a Z-equilibrium strategy in the game  if uZ is both Pareto-optimal and an active equilibrium strategy.Now we analyze some properties of the Z-equilibrium strategies and comparethem with other optimal strategies.Property 4.3. (Pareto-optimality). By Denition 4.2 we have that Z-equilibriaare Pareto-optimal, i.e. they look after (guarantee) the collective interests of theplayers.Property 4.4. (Active stability of Z-equilibria against unilateral deviation of aplayer.) Let uZ 2 U be a Z-equilibrium point in the game  . Then Denition 4.1implies that for every strategy ui 2 Ui of the i-th player (i 2 I) there is a collectionof strategies ûIri 2 UIri such thatJi(ui; ûIri) = Ji(uZ) :Thus, if the i-th player uses a strategy ui dierent from uZi , then the other playersI r i can punish the deecting one. Moreover, I r i generates an active responseûIri to each ui. Let us note that Nash-equilibria (see Denition 3.5) are also stableversus the deection of one player: for each ui 2 UiJi(ui; unIri) = Ji(un); i 2 Iwhere un 2 U is a Nash-equilibrium point. However, here the penalty unIri ispassive. In fact the players I r i simply stick to their strategies from un.Property 4.5. (Individual rationality). Let ugi 2 Ui be a guaranteeing (minimax)strategy of the i-th player (see Denition 3.6) and let uZ 2 U be a Z-equilibrium.Then for ugi there exists ûIri by Denition 4.2 such thatJi(uZ) 5 Ji(ugi ; ûIri) 5 maxuIri Ji(ugi ; uIri) = minui maxuIri Ji(u); i 2 I :Thus, the values of the cost-functions in a Z-equilibrium point are at most equalto the minimax values.Property 4.6. (Pareto-optimal Nash-equilibria are Z-equilibria). The Pareto-optimality is required for the Z-equilibrium. Thus we have to prove that the Nash-equilibrium implies the active equilibrium. Let un 2 U be a Nash-equilibrium pointin the game  . Then for each ui 2 UiJi(ui; unIri) = Ji(un); i 2 I :Thus, for each ui 2 Ui we can choose ûIri = unIri and by Denition 4.1 weconclude that un is an active equilibrium.
Z{EQUILIBRIA IN STOCHASTIC GAMES 129Property 4.7. (Saddle-points in two-person zero-sum games are Z-equilibriumpoints). Let us consider the two-person zero-sum game 0 = hf1; 2g;P; fU1;U2g; J(u1; u2)iwith the objection of minimizing J(u1; u2) for the rst player and maximizingJ(u1; u2) for the second one. Let (u01; u02) be a saddle-point of  0:J(u01; u2) 5 J(u01; u02) 5 J(u1; u02)for each u1 2 U1; u2 2 U2.We consider also the game 2 = hf1; 2g;P; fU1;U2g; fJ1; J2giwhere J1(u1; u2) = J(u1; u2) and J2(u1; u2) =  J(u1; u2). Here both playerschoose their strategiess with the aim of minimizing their own cost-functions.First we prove that the saddle-point (u01; u02) of  0 is Pareto-optimal in  2.Suppose (u01; u02) is not Pareto-optimal in  2. Then there exists a pair of strategies(u1; u2) 2 U1  U2 such thatJi(u1; u2) 5 Ji(u01; u02); i = 1; 2where at least one of these two inequalities is strict. HenceJ1(u1; u2) + J2(u1; u2) < J1(u01; u02) + J2(u01; u02)i.e. 0 = J(u1; u2)  J(u1; u2) < J(u01; u02)   J(u01; u02) = 0which is wrong. Therefore the Pareto-optimality of (u01; u02) is established.Second we show the active equilibrium property of (u01; u02) in  2. Indeed, foreach u1 2 U1 we put û2 = u02 and for each u2 2 U2 we put û1 = u01. Thus we getJ1(u1; û2) = J1(u1; u02) = J(u1; u02) = J(u01; u02) = J1(u01; u02)and J2(û1; u2) = J2(u01; u2) =  J(u01; u2) =  J(u01; u02) = J2(u01; u02) :Therefore we arrive at the conclusion that the notion of a Z-equilibrium includesthe notion of a saddle-point for zero-sum two-players games.
130 SVATOSLAV GAIDOV5. Sufficient conditionsIn this section we shall nd conditions which are sucient for the Z-equilibriumstrategies. DenoteGi(t; x; u) = V (i)t (t; x) +A(u)V (i)(t; x) + Li(t; x; u); i 2 Iwhere t 2 [t0; T ], x 2 Rn, u 2 U .Theorem. Suppose for the strategy uZ 2 U the next three groups of conditionsjointly hold:1) There exist a vector  = (1; : : : ; N ) 2 RN; i > 0; i 2 I, 1 +   + N = 1and a real-valued function V (t; x) such that for all t 2 [t0; T ]; x 2 Rn thefollowing conditions jointly hold:(a1) V; Vt; Vx; Vxx are continuous;(b1) H(t; x; uZ) = 0;(c1) H(t; x; u) = 0 for each strategy u 2 U ;(d1) V (T; x) =Pi2I i	i(T; x) .2) There exist real-valued functions V (i)(t; x); i 2 I such that for all t 2 [t0; T ]; x 2Rn and i 2 I the following conditions jointly hold:(a2) V (i); V (i)t ; V (i)x ; V (i)xx are continuous;(b2) Gi(t; x; uZ) = 0;(c2) V (i)(T; x) = 	i(T; x).3) For each i 2 I and arbitrary strategy ui 2 Ui there exists a collection of strate-gies ûIri 2 UIri such that Gi(t; x; ui; ûIri) = 0 :Then the strategy uZ 2 U is a Z-equilibrium strategy in the game  .Proof. Conditions 1) are equivalent to the conditions of Theorem 3.2, i.e. thestrategy uZ 2 U is Pareto-optimal. Let the set of functions V (i)(t; x), i 2 Iwith continuous derivatives be the solution of the system of equations (b2) withboundary conditions (c2). Suppose XZ = fxZ(t); t 2 [t0; T ]g and X(i) = fx(i)(t),t 2 [t0; T ]g are the solutions of Ito equation () corresponding to the strategies uZand (ui; ûIri), respectively.Next write the formula of Ito-Dynkin for V (i)(t; x); uZ and XZ :V (i)(t;x) = Et;xfV (i)(T; x(T )) R Tt [V (i)t (; xZ( ))+A(uZ )V (i)(; xZ( ))] dg; i 2 I :This representation in conjunction with (b2) and (c2) implies thatV (i)(t; x) = Et;xf	i(T; xZ(T )) + R Tt Li(; xZ( ); uZ) dg; i 2 I ;
Z{EQUILIBRIA IN STOCHASTIC GAMES 131and henceV (i)(t0; x0) = Et0 ;x0f	i(T; xZ(T )) + R Tt0 Li(t; xZ(t); uZ) dtg; i 2 I :Now write again the formula of Ito-Dynkin for V (i)(t; x) but with (ui; ûIri) andX(i): V (i)(t; x) = Et;xfV (i)(T; xi(T ))   R Tt [V (i)t (; x(i)( ))+A(ui; ûIri)V (i)(; x(i)( ))] dg; i 2 I :Taking into account conditions 3) and (c2), we getV (i)(t; x) = Et;xf	i(T; x(i)(T )) + R Tt Li(; x(i)( ); ui; ûIri) dg; i 2 Iwhich leads toV (i)(t0; x0) = Et0 ;x0f	i(T; x(i)(T )) + R Tt0 Li(t; x(i)(t); ui; ûIri) dtg; i 2 I :Finaly we have V (i)(t0; x0) = Ji(uZ) 5 Ji(ui; ûIri); i 2 I :This means that uZ is an active equilibrium strategy in   and hence uZ is aZ-equilibrium strategy. So the proof of the Theorem is completed. 6. Linear-quadratic gameNow consider the linear-quadratic stochastic dierential game  lq , described inSection 2. Let the conditions of Proposition 3.3 hold. Then the strategiesuZi = uPi =  [g2i (t)K(t) +N (i) (t)] 1Bi(t)K(t)x; i 2 Iare Pareto-optimal strategies in the game  lq .Further we follow the procedure of searching the Z-equilibrium from the The-orem of Section 5 and construct the functionsGi(t; x; u) = V (i)t (t; x) + [A(t)x+Pj2I Bj(t)uj]V (i)x (t; x)+12[g20(t)x2 +Pj2I g2j (t)u2j + gN+1(t)]V (i)xx (t; x)+Mi(t)x2 +Pj2I N (i)j (t)u2j ; i 2 I :We search V (i)(t; x) as a solution of the equationGi(t; x; uZ) = 0
132 SVATOSLAV GAIDOVwith the boundary condition V (i)(T; x) = Dix2 in the following special formV (i)(t; x) = i(t)x2 + ri(t)where i(t) and ri(t) are real-valued functions, i 2 I. thus we get for each i 2 Ithe nonhomogeneous linear dierential equation_i(t) + 2A(t)i(t)   2i(t)K(t)Pj2IB2j (t)[g2j (t)K(t) +N (j) (t)] 1+g20(t)i(t) +Pj2I g2j (t)[g2j (t)K(t) +N (j) (t)] 2B2j (t)K2(t) i(t)+Mi(t) +Pj2I N (i)j (t)[g2j (t)K(t) + N (j) (t)] 2B2j (t)K2(t) = 0with boundary condition i(T ) = Di and_ri(t) + g2N+1(t)i(t) = 0 :Suppose Di is a non-negative constant and Mi(t), N (i)j (t), j 2 I are non-negativefunctions, i 2 I. Taking into account this assumption and the continuity of the co-ecients of the last equation we get the existence and uniqueness of its continuoussolution i(t) which is non-negative for each t 2 [t0; T ].Now we can have the following representationGi(t; x; u) = x2f _i(t) + 2A(t) i(t) + g20(t) i(t) +Mi(t)g+2Pj2I Bj(t)uji(t)x+Pj2I g2j (t)u2ji(t) +Pj2IN (i)j (t)u2j :Next, take arbitrary i 2 I and let ui = Fi(t)x. Fix j 2 I r i and let uj = axwhere a is a positive constant. Also let uk = uZk , k 2 Irfi; jg. Then for a suitableS(t) we can write Gi(t; x; u) in the formGi(t; x; u) = x2fS(t) + 2aBj(t)i(t) + a2[g2j (t) i(t) +N (i)j (t)]g :Suppose N (i)j (t) is a positive function for each t 2 [t0; T ]. Then g2j (t) i(t)+N (i)j (t)is a positive as well. This implies the existence of a positive number a such thatthe quantity S(t) + 2aBj(t) i(t) + (a)2[g2j (t) i(t) +N (i)j (t)]is positive for all t 2 [t0; T ]. Hence, if we put uj = ax we getGi(t; x; ui; ûIri) = 0where ûIri = fuj ; uZk ; k 2 I r fi; jgg. Thus uZ = uP is an active equilibrium inthe game  lq and we come to the following result.
Z{EQUILIBRIA IN STOCHASTIC GAMES 133Proposition. Let Di ; i 2 I be non-negative constants, Mi(t); i 2 I and N (i)j (t),i; j 2 I be non-negative functions for each t 2 [t0; T ]. Let there exist a vector = (1; : : : ; N ) 2 RN such that i > 0; i 2 I, 1+  +N = 1 and N (i) (t); i 2 Iare positive functions for each t 2 [t0; T ]. Let for every i 2 I there exist j 2 I r isuch that the function N (i)j (t) is positive for all t 2 [t0; T ]. Then uZ is a Z-equilibrium strategy in the game  lq .Acknowledgement. The problems considered in the present paper, as well asseveral other topics were a subject of my discussions with Dr. Jordan Stoyanov. Iuse the opportunity to express my gratitude for his support and helpful talks.References[1] Fleming,W. H., Rishel, R. W., Deterministic and Stochastic Optimal Control, Springer-Ver-lag, Berlin { Heidelberg { New York, 1975.[2] Gaidov, S. D., Z-Equilibrium in Stochastic Di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